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I. Introduction 
" 'But,' quoth Trinquamelle, 'my friend, how come you to 
know, understand, and resolve, the obscurity of these various 
and seeming contrary passages in law, which are laid claim to 
by the suitors and pleading parties?' 'Even just,' quoth Bridle-
goose, 'after the fashion of your other worships; to wit, when 
there are many bags on the one side, and on the other, I then 
use my little small dice . . . I have other large great dice, 
fair, and goodly ones, which I employ on the fashion that your 
other worships use to do when the matter is more plain, clear, 
and liquid; that is to say, when there are fewer bags.' 'But 
when you have done all those fine things,' quoth Trinquamelle, 
'how do you, my friend, award your decrees, and pronounce 
judgment?' 'Even as your, other worships,' answered Bridle-
goose; 'for I give out sentence in his favour unto whom hath 
befallen the best chance by dice; judiciary, tribunian, pre-
torial, what comes first: so our laws command.' " 
I. Jurisdiction 
Francois Rabelais, 
Gargantua and Pantagruel 
One of the more important recent developments in Califor-
nia procedural law is the enactment of an entirely new set of 
provisions dealing with personal jurisdiction and service of 
process. The new procedure is effective July 1, 1970, and will 
alter substantially a number of current practices. 
A. Background of Increased Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents 
One important change is the new Code of Civil Procedure 
section 410.10, which reads: 
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A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any 
basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state 
or of the United States. 
Until now, California courts have had no general law directly 
defining the scope of their power over the person of defend-
ants both within and without the state. Rather, the courts 
have utilized statutes ostensibly dealing with methods of serv-
ing process to determine such jurisdictional questions. For 
example, jurisdiction over foreign businesses has been defined 
under Code of Civil Procedure section 411, which is entitled 
"Summons; Method of Service. . ." and which states: 
The summons must be served by delivering a copy thereof 
as follows: 
* * * 
2. If the suit is against a foreign corporation, or a non-
resident joint stock company or association, doing busi-
ness in this state: in the manner provided by SectiQns 
6500 to 6504, inclusive of the Corporations Code. 
The cited sections of the Corporations Code merely list the 
persons on whom service may be made. Nevertheless, by 
seizing on the words "doing business in this state," the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has converted section 411.2, into a 
provision that not only authorizes jurisdiction over foreign 
businesses, but also authorizes jurisdiction whenever such au-
thorization would not be unconstitutional. l This position was 
reaffirmed recently by the supreme court in Buckeye Boiler 
Co. v. Superior Court,2 which involved a foreign corporation, 
and in International Aerial Tramway Corp. v. Konrad Dop-
pelmayr & Sohn,3 which concerned a foreign partnership. 
Thus, insofar as such foreign business organizations are con-
cerned, new section 410.10 will do no more than give direct 
formal approval to a practice that has already long been in 
existence. 
1. Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Su- 2.71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 
perior Court, 49 Cal.2d 855, 858-59, 458 P.2d 57 (1969). 
323 P.2d 437 (1958). 3. 70 Cal.2d 400, 74 Cal. Rptr. 908, 
450 P.2d 284 (1969). 
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With respect to individual defendants, however, section 
410.10 will have a more substantial impact. There are now 
general provisions for service of process on individuals resid-
ing outside the state. However, such service can confer juris-
diction over persons only as permitted under section 417, as 
follows: 
Where jurisdiction is acquired over a person who is 
outside of this State by publication of summons in accord-
ance with sections 412 and 413, the court shall have the 
power to render a personal judgment against such person 
only if he was personally served with a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint, and was a resident of this State (a) 
at the time of the commencement of the action, or (b) 
at the time that the cause of action arose, or (c) at the 
time of service. 
In addition to these general provisions, a number of statutes 
permit jurisdiction over nonresidents in specific types of cases 
and prescribe special methods of service in connection there-
with. For example, jurisdiction can be obtained over any non-
resident motorist who is involved in an automobile collision 
in this state,4 or over a nonresident pilot whose plane crashes 
here,5 primarily by service of process on the California Secre-
tary of State. There remains outside of both of these general 
and special provisions, however, a substantial number of 
situations where jurisdiction over nonresident individuals is 
not permitted, although there would be no constitutional bar-
riers to such jurisdiction.6 This latter group of cases will soon 
be triable in California under new section 410.10. 
The new statute is in line with modern jurisdictional provi-
sions enacted in other states7 in response to changing concepts 
regarding the constitutional scope of a state's judicial power. 
These major changes began to take shape after the landmark 
4. Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 17451-
17456. 
5. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 24254. 
6. A case that might very well fall 
into this group is Sylvester v. King Mfg. 
Co., 256 Cal. App.2d 236, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
4 
4 (1967). See Friedenthal, CiVIL PRO-
CEDURE, Cal Law-Trends and De-
velopments 1969, 191 at 216-223. 
7. See, e.g., N.Y.C.P.L.R. 302(a); 
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-5-33. 
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Supreme Court decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton,S in which the Court said: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present 
within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice." 
Prior to this decision, the major basis for personal jurisdiction 
was that of presence in the state at the time of service.9 In 
earlier times, when commercial transactions were less complex 
and individuals less mobile, a plaintiff could usually find the 
defendant in the same or a neighboring community. But all 
this has changed and, frequently, one party now lives far dis-
tant from his opponent, a fact requiring a new accommodation 
among the interests of the parties and a state in which an at-
tempt is made to institute a suit. 
Initial concepts of jurisdiction were grounded on notions 
of state sovereignty. A state could not, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, "invade" the sovereign environs of a second 
state by assuining jurisdiction over persons located in the 
second state.10 When a person entered a state, he was con-
sidered to have automatically received benefits of protection 
offered by that state, and was obligated to obey the laws of 
that state and was subject to its controls, including the juris-
diction of its courts. A state's jurisdiction, however, was not 
limited solely to those present within its borders. It was per-
mitted to exercise jurisdiction over those absentees who were 
domiciled in the state and over any person who consented to 
be bound. 11 
8. 326 u.s. 310, 90 L.Ed. 95, 66 
S.Ct. 154, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945). 
9. Developments in the Law-State-
Court Jurisdiction, 73 Rarv. L. Rev. 
909 at 915-17, 919-23, 936-39 (1960). 
10. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714, 722-23, 24 L.Ed. 565, 568-69 
(1877). 
CAL LAW 1970 
11. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 
The Due Process Clause And The In 
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 
25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569-575 (1958); 
Developments in the Law-State-Court 
Jurisdiction, 73 Rarv. L. Rev. 909 at 
916-23, 941-45 (1960). 
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The ground of consent, or more appropriately a distortion 
thereof, was first utilized as a means of expanding state juris-
diction over nonresidents when the concept of jurisdiction by 
presence proved unsatisfactory and unjustified. Each state, as 
a prerequisite to permitting nonresidents to participate in cer-
tain activities within the state, simply required such persons to 
consent in advance to the jurisdiction of its courts over suits 
arising from those activities. 12 Eventually, such consent be-
came completely fictionalized, for it was deemed that simply 
by engaging in these activities, the person had consented. 
This procedure was approved by the United States Supreme 
Court in Hess v. Pawloski, 13 where the court held valid a state 
nonresident motor vehicle statute providing that any person 
who drove a motor vehicle on the highways of the state auto-
matically consented to the jurisdiction of that state's courts in 
any case arising from a vehicle accident in which he was in-
volved. Although the Court paid lip service to the "consent" 
involved, the basis of the decision, in reality, was the strong 
interest that the state had in the subject of the action. 
The stretching of the concept of consent was strictly limited, 
since there are many activities of nonresidents that a state has 
no power to prevent or control.14 Thus, if jurisdiction was to 
be expanded, it was necessary to attack and break down the 
requirement of presence as the major source of state power, 
and to substitute instead the "minimum contacts" approach 
of International Shoe. 
Once it became clear that increased judicial power was 
available, state legislatures came under pressure to rewrite 
their jurisdiction provisions. In California, the state supreme 
court in Atkinson v. Superior Court15 made clear its dissatis-
faction with the limited scope of jurisdiction under section 
417, by avoiding its terms in a most artificial manner.16 The 
12. Kurland, supra, note 11, at 575-
77,578-82. 
13. 274 U.S. 352, 71 L.Ed. 1091, 47 
S.Ct. 632 (1927). 
14. See Kurland, supra, note 11, at 
578-81; Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 
289, 63 L.Ed. 250, 39 S.Ct. 97 (1919). 
6 
15. 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960, 
cert. den., app. dismd. 357 U.S. 569, 
2 L.Ed.2d 1546, 78 S.Ct. 1381 (1957). 
16. The out-of-state defendant could 
not be brought within the terms of 
§ 417. The Court, therefore, resorted 
to the traditional method of obtaining 
CAL LAW 1970 
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court "plainly suggested that all jurisdictional prob-
lems be approached as ones of the existence of minimum con-
tacts between the forum and the transaction in litigation."l7 
In responding to pressures to enlarge jurisdictional provi-
sions the legislature has two choices; it may either attempt to 
set out in detail a list of those situations where jurisdiction is 
permissible,18 or it may simply state, as does California's new 
section 410.10, that its courts may exercise all the jurisdiction 
that the Constitution allows. 
The former approach has one major advantage: it sum-
marizes for the attorneys and the courts situations in which ju-
risdiction is appropriate, and, except for an occasional clause 
that may be alleged to go beyond constitutional boundaries, it 
tends to curtail jurisdictional battles. Under section 410.10, 
the limitations will appear only after a study of federal and 
state cases and will tend to encourage plaintiffs to attempt 
service whenever there is a chance that the jurisdiction is valid. 
Defendants, on the other hand, will be induced to fight ju-
jurisdiction over such a person by seiz-
ing property owned by him and located 
in the forum state. The problem in 
A tkinson was that the basic fact in is-
sue was the ownership of the property 
seized; plaintiff claimed that it, not de-
fendant, was the true owner. The 
Court held that this made no differ-
ence, accepting jurisdiction because of 
the close relationship between the cause 
of action and the state. 
17. Hazard, A General Theory of 
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 S. Ct. 
Rev. 241 at 281. 
18. E.g., N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a) 
reads: 
As to a cause of action arising from 
any of'the acts enumerated in this sec-
tion, a court may exercise personal ju-
risdiction over any nondomiciliary, or 
his executor or administrator, who in 
person or through an agent: 
1. transacts any business within the 
state; or 
CAL LAW 1970 
2. commits a tortious act within the 
state, except as to a cause of action 
for defamation of character arising 
from the act; or 
3. commits a tortious act without the 
state causing injury to person or prop-
erty within the state, except as to a 
cause of action for defamation of char-
acter arising from the act, if he 
(i) regularly does or solicits business, 
or engages in any other persistent 
course of conduct, or derives substan-
tial revenue from goods used or con-
sumed or services rendered, in the state, 
or 
(ii) expects or should reasonably ex-
pect the act to have consequences in the 
state and derives substantial revenue 
from interstate or international com-
merce; or 
4. owns, uses or possesses any real 
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risdiction more often. Parties may be tempted to litigate the 
question in order to delay and gain tactical advantages. 
Of the two possible choices, the California approach seems 
superior. First, it has proved extremely difficult to draft clear, 
detailed statutes, with the result that such statutes have been 
the subject of numerous cases of interpretation, and the ju-
risdiction of the state courts has sometimes been limited be-
yond legislative intent, requiring the enactment of amend-
ments. 19 
Second, the constitutional limitations on jurisdiction are 
still in a state of flux.20 A detailed statute intended to allow 
courts the full measure of power over nonresidents may be out 
of date in one aspect or another soon after it is enacted. As 
courts develop greater sophistication in dealing with the min-
imum contacts notion, it may even be that certain traditionally 
accepted grounds for jurisdiction will be held invalid. 1 For 
example, the Supreme Court might well nullify a statute that 
permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant solely 
on the basis that he was served with process while an airplane 
in which he was a passenger was flying over state territory.2 
Third, in California, as has already been noted, the courts 
have adopted and defined a standard for jurisdiction over non-
resident business organizations identical with that of the new 
section 410.10. Thus, there already exists a substantial, well-
known series of cases regarding the constitutional limitations 
of jurisdiction. These cases may minimize the number of sit-
uations that arise requiring interpretation. 
Finally, California's new statute has come relatively late in 
time compared to other major jurisdictions, such as Illinois 
and New York.3 Numerous cases and other materials inter-
preting the laws of these states will be of aid in California. 
19. See 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, gested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121 
New York Civil Practice, pp. 3-26-3-27- (1966) . 
. 6 (N.Y. Judicial Conference comments 1. See Von Mehren & Trautman, su, 
on 1966 Amendments to N.Y.C.P.L.R. pra, note 20, at 1178-79. 
§ 302). 2. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. 
20. See Von Mehren & Trautman, Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). 
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug- 3. The Illinois provision, Civil Prac-
8 CAL LAW 1970 
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B. The "Minimum Contacts" Doctrine 
The broadening of state court jurisdiction pursuant to the 
International Shoe decision has been the focus of a vast num-
ber of law review articles,4 model statutes,5 and restatements 
of the law,6 not to mention actual legislative enactments and 
judicial decisions. Much of the literature is directed toward 
future developments regarding both further increases and de-
creases in traditional judicial powers.7 A glance at these 
materials is sufficient to demonstrate that no definitive state-
ment is possible as to the precise constitutional limitations on 
personal jurisdiction or as to the scope of new section 410.10. 
It would not be prudent, even were it possible, to summarize 
here the many varied ideas that have been discussed. There 
is, however, one major area, that of business activities of non-
residents, where a review of recent literature, in particular the 
recent decision of the California supreme court, in Buckeye 
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court,S will be helpful in interpreting 
the new statute. 
There seems little question that insofar as business activities 
are concerned, the new statute will apply equally to individ-
tice Act § 17, was enacted on July 19, 
1955. The comparable New York Law, 
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302, took effect on Sep-
tember 1, 1963. 
4. See, e.g.: 
Currie, The Growth of the Long 
Arm: Eight Years of Extended Juris-
diction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.P. 
533; Hazard, A General Theory of 
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 S. Ct. 
Rev. 241; Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdic-
tion of California Courts to Render 
Judgments Against Foreign Corpora-
tions and Non-Resident Individuals, 31 
So. Cal. L. Rev. 339 (1958); Kurland, 
The Supreme Court, The Due Process 
Clause, And The In Personam Jurisdic-
tion of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
569 (1958); Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 
72 Harv. L. Rev. 695 (1959); Von 
Mehren & Trautman. Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 
CAL LAW 1970 
Harv. L. Rev. 1121 (1966); Jurisdic-
tion over Nonresident Manufacturers in 
Product Liability Actions, 63 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1028 (1965); Developments in 
the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 
Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1960). 
5. See 9B, Uniform Laws Ann., Uni-
form Interstate and International Pro-
cedure Act., pp. 305-37. 
6. See Restatement of the Law, Sec-
ond, Conflict of Laws, Proposed Offi-
cial Draft, Part I, ch. 3, pp. 125-300 
(1967) . 
7. See, e.g., Von Mehren & Traut-
man, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121 
(1966); Ehrenzweig, The Transient 
Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 
65 Yale L.J. 289 (1956). 
8. 71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 
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uals, corporations, and associations. Nothing inherent in the 
type of business ownership structure should affect the consti-
tutional limits on jurisdiction; rather, it is the nature of the 
contacts that any business has with the state that should be 
controlling. Thus, the Buckeye decision is not only important 
in respect to jurisdiction over foreign corporations, but the 
decision takes on added significance since the principles set 
out will, under the new statute, govern businesses owned by 
individuals as well. 
Plaintiff in Buckeye alleged that he was injured while at 
work at a General Electric plant in California when a pressure 
tank manufactured by Buckeye exploded. There was no 
direct evidence as to when or from whom the tank had been 
purchased. Buckeye, which did not advertise its products, 
sold them through manufacturer's agents in a number of states, 
all located east of the Mississippi River. The company's only 
contact with California was the sale of tanks to the Cochin 
Manufacturing Company of Ohio, which has a plant in South 
San Francisco. For several years, Cochin had bought some 
$25,000 to $35,000 worth of tanks from Buckeye. Cochin 
did not resell any of these tanks, but used them exclusively in 
the manufacture of hydraulic automobile lifts for service sta-
tions. The lifts were sold both in and out of California. 
The tanks shipped to Cochin were larger in size than the one 
that exploded in the General Electric plant. 
In holding that on these facts California courts could consti-
tutionally (and hence statutorily) obtain jurisdiction over the 
Buckeye Corporation, the court made several important 
points. First, it noted that jurisdiction over a non-
resident would lie only if he had purposely conducted some 
activity within the forum state. This was held to be a re-
quirement established by the United States Supreme Court 
in Hanson v. Denckla,9 one of the few recent decisions of the 
Court limiting jurisdiction by a state over a nonresident. Sec-
ond, it held that to purposely conduct activities within a state, 
a nonresident need only engage "in economic activity within 
9. 357 U.S. 235, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 78 
S.Ct. 1228 (1958). 
10 CAL LAW 1970 
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this state 'as a matter of commercial actuality.' ,,10 If a man-
ufacturer foresees or should reasonably have foreseen that his 
products will be sold or resold in the state, then he has met 
the "economic activity" requirement, even though the relation-
ship between the manufacturer and the use of his product in 
the state is indirect. This is true whether his product reaches 
the forum in its original form or whether, along the way, it has 
been incorporated as a component of some larger product. 
Third, defendant's amenability to state process may be based 
either on the fact that he purposely conducts substantial busi-
ness activity within the state or on the fact that the cause of 
action arose out of "purposely conducted" activity in the state, 
even though there may be only an isolated instance of such 
activity. 
In Buckeye, the court relied on both grounds, although the 
factual basis for each is weak. Sale of tanks to a single Cali-
fornia buyer, even for incorporation in a product to be widely 
distributed, is hardly a strong basis for assumption of juris-
diction in a case totally unrelated to those sales. In 1959, in 
Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court,tl where plaintiff 
brought suit for injuries incurred in Idaho caused by an explo-
sion allegedly due to defendant corporation's defective equip-
ment, the California Supreme Court ordered service quashed 
on a defendant whose only contact with California was the 
promotion and sale of its products through independent man-
ufacturer's agents. Although the case differed factually from 
Buckeye in several respects, the major point seems applicable: 
jurisdiction cannot be based on activities in the state totally 
unrelated to the cause of action unless those activities are 
direct, continuous, and systematic, and sufficiently extensive 
to make the exercise of jurisdiction fair and equitable.12 The 
sale of one's products on a regional or nationwide basis can-
not, by itself, justify general jurisdiction over the corporation 
in every state involved.13 
10. 71 CaI.2d-, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, dated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 96 L. 
458 P.2d 57. Ed. 485, 72 S.Ct. 413 (1952). 
11. 53 Cal.2d 222, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13. Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior 
347 P.2d 1 (1959). Court, 53 Cal.2d 222, 225, 1 Cal. Rptr. 
12. See Perkins v. Benguet Consoli. 1, 347 P.2d 1 (1959). 
CAL LAW 1970 11 
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On the other hand, the attempt of the court in Buckeye to 
justify jurisdiction on the ground that the injury was received 
as a result of defendant's economic activities in California is 
undercut by the paucity of evidence regarding the purchase of 
the tank and the means by which it entered the state. The 
court's conclusion that the "cause of action appears to arise 
from . . . sales of pressure tanks to California customers 
or to other customers for foreseeable resale or use in Cali-
forniam4 is simply not supported by the facts. 
The court sought to overcome the above factual weak-
nesses of its arguments in its fourth major point involving 
manipulation of the burden of proof. That it did so in a 
footnote16 is somewhat surprising since the matter is not only 
of crucial significance in the case but is also a concept unique 
in the law in this area. Although recognizing that the initial 
burden of establishing jurisdiction is on plaintiff, the court 
held that at some point the burden shifted to defendant regard-
ing both bases upon which jurisdiction was predicated. To 
avoid jurisdiction on the ground that defendant's total activ-
ities in the state did not warrant the assumption of power over 
it, defendant would have had to show that the burden of de-
fending the present case would have differed substantially 
from the defense of suits that might possibly arise from de-
fendant's sales to the Cochin Company. To avoid suit on the 
ground that the cause of action did not arise out of defendant's 
purposeful activities in the state, it would have had to show 
that the arrival of the exploded tank in California was unfore-
seen and unforeseeable. 
These shifts in the burden of proof apparently occur when-
ever plaintiff shows merely that defendant sells products in 
interstate commerce without direct control over the destina-
tion or that defendant directly engages in some activity in 
the forum. Once the shift takes place, defendant cannot carry 
its burden by relying generally on a description of its business 
methods and activities; it must go further and deal specifically 
with the matter in question. For example, Buckeye, to avoid 
14. 71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 122, 15. 71 Cal.2d -, n. 9, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
458 P.2d 66. 122, n. 9, 458 P.2d 66, n. 9. 
12 CAL LAW 1970 
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jurisdiction, would have had to trace the exploded tank so as 
to determine how and where General Electric, which itself had 
no records, obtained it. As a practical matter, the cost of such 
an inquiry, even if successful, would induce many nonresident 
defendants to forego jurisdictional challenges and to spend 
the time and money fighting their cases on the merits in the 
forum state. This will likely be more true when small, in-
dividually owned businesses are brought into the picture under 
new section 410.10. 
From an analytical point of view, there is certainly no rea-
son why the burden of proof on jurisdictional matters should 
fall on plaintiff rather than defendant. In an era of expanding 
state court powers over nonresidents, a shift of the burden 
will simply speed what seems to be the inevitable final result, 
that a state court will have the power to accept jurisdiction 
over all defendants who have any contact whatsoever with 
the state. 
C. The Balance of Conveniences-Constitutional Crite-
rion or Basis of Discretion 
A fifth major point made in the Buckeye decision was that 
even if the defendant were found to have sufficient contacts 
with the forum, the power of the court to accept jurisdiction 
would still depend "upon a balancing of the inconvenience to 
the defendant in having to defend itself in the forum state 
against both the interest of the plaintiff in suing locally and 
the interrelated interest of the state in assuming jurisdiction."16 
This raises two important questions. First, just what cases, if 
any, would meet the "minimum contacts" requirement and 
still fail the balancing test? Second, new section 410.30 pro-
vides: 
When a court upon motion of a party or its own 
motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an 
action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the 
court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part 
on any conditions that may be just. 
16. 71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 118. 
458 P.2d 62. 
CAL LAW 1970 13 
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In light of the balancing test, will this new provision have 
any purpose? 
In determining the question whether jurisdiction over a non-
resident is permissible, California courts have given lip serv-
ice to the idea of balancing conveniences by noting such fac-
tors as the general availability of evidence, the location of wit-
nesses, the ease of access to an alternative forum, and the 
avoidance of a multiplicity of suits.17 Normally, however, the 
inquiry has been made in the context of showing the nature of 
the contacts between the forum and the cause of action; 
there has not been a California decision in which the basic 
contacts have been held sufficient and yet where the court, on 
constitutional grounds, has refused, or even seriously con-
sidered refusal of, jurisdiction under the balancing test. 
One can find18 or hypothesize situations in which the "bal-
I 
ancing of conveniences" would have utility, but this can be 
handled adequately under the so-called forum non conveniens 
rule, such as that set out in new section 410.30, by permitting 
the courts, in their discretion, to require the suit to be brought 
elsewhere. If the balancing test becomes a constitutional re-
quirement, several unfortunate results could ensue. First, 
wealthy out-of-state defendants will be encouraged to run up 
the costs of litigation by challenging jurisdiction at appellate 
as well as at trial levels, even though their contacts with the 
forum are clearly sufficient to meet the "minimum contacts" 
17. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
113, 458 P.2d 57 (1969); Fisher Gov-
ernor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 
2d 222, 225-26, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3-4, 347 
P.2d 1, 3-4 (1959); Henry R. Jahn & 
Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 
855, 861-62, 323 P.2d 437 (1958). 
18. One such decision is Conn v. 
Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 
(1959), decided by the Supreme Court 
of Utah, which refused to give full faith 
and credit to an Illinois judgment. The 
plaintiff, from his residence in Illinois, 
had mailed a list of horses he was offer-
ing for sale to defendant in Utah. De-
14 
fendant, after having a friend in Illi-
nois inspect the horses, sent a letter ac-
cepting plaintiff's offer and enclosing 
partial payment. He then sent an agent 
to Illinois to accept delivery. A dis-
pute developed, defendant refused to 
pay the balance of the purchase price, 
and plaintiff sued. Although it seems 
clear that defendant's contacts with Il-
linois met a "minimum contacts" re-
quirement, the implications of permit-
ting a party doing nationwide business 
by mail to solve disputes regarding such 
business in its home forum induced 
the Utah Court to reject the Illinois 
court's jurisdiction. 
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requirement. Second, if a California court decides that the 
balance of conveniences requires suit in another state, it would 
have no choice but to dismiss the action, even though the 
forum to which plaintiff is directed subsequently disagrees, 
taking the position that on balance the action should have 
been brought in California. Plaintiff could be left without any 
forum whatever. Under a statutory, nonconstitutional forum 
non conveniens rule, however, the case need not be dismissed; 
it can be stayed until such time as the plaintiff has completed 
his action in the other forum, and if, for some reason, the 
other forum proves unavailable, the California action can 
simply be revived. 
Why the court in Buckeye decided to treat the balancing 
test as an overriding constitutional requirement is a mystery. 
Although there has been much written on the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens19 and the need for it in light of expand-
ing constitutional state powers over nonresidents, it has not 
been suggested as a limitation on those powers. 20 The United 
States Supreme Court in its decisions on jurisdiction has not 
sought to limit jurisdiction to that one state where suit would 
be most convenient; rather, the emphasis has been on the ex-
pansion of the number of places where plaintiff might validly 
pursue his action. 1 
Certainly, the California legislature, in enacting section 
19. See the authorities cited in 1969 
Report of the Judicial Council of Cali-
fomia, pp. 92-96. 
20. The court in Buckeye cited Ehr-
enzweig, The Transient Rule of Per-
so/wi Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth 
and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 
289 at 312 (1956). The author, in dis-
cussing the possible demise of the doc-
trine permitting a transient defendant 
to be sued in any state he can be found, 
stated as follows: "Once this doctrine 
has been deprived of its vitality . . . 
the primary reason for the continued 
existence of the transient rule will have 
disappeared. Forum non conveniens, 
which now allows discretionary refusal 
to 'take' jurisditcion, may then assume 
CAL LAW 1970 
the positive function of identifying the 
forum conveniens in terms of substan-
tial contacts such as plaintiff's residence, 
the origin of the cause of action, or 
the presence of property." Read in 
proper context, this statement merely 
states that all jurisdiction should be 
based on a minimum contacts rule and 
not on an outmoded historical basis of 
presence. In no way does it indicate 
a separate balancing-of-conveniences 
test over and above the minimum con-
tacts rule. 
t. See International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-19, 90 
L.Ed. 95, 101-104, 66 S.Ct. 154, 
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410.30, did not accept the notion of a constitutional balancing 
test, since there would have been little need for the provision 
had it done so. And the Judicial Council, in its analysis of 
section 410.30, reflected a similar view in the following 
terms: 
The various bases of judicial jurisdiction recognized un-
der the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution establish 
the outermost limits beyond which a state court may not 
exercise its judicial jurisdiction. Within these limits, the 
owner of a transitory cause of action will often have a 
wide choice of forums in which to bring his action. 
Some of these forums may have little relation either to 
the parties or the cause of action, and suit in them may 
increase greatly the burden to defendant of making a 
defense. Under the doctrine of inconvenient forum a 
court, even though it has jurisdiction will not entertain 
the suit if it believes that the forum of filing is a seriously 
inconvenient forum for the trial of the action. 
The doctrine of inconvenient forum is not jurisdictional. 
If a state chooses to exercise such judicial jurisdiction as 
it possesses despite the fact that it is an inappropriate 
forum, its action in this regard is valid and will be entitled 
to full faith and credit in other states.2 
Even the California Supreme Court itself has taken a con-
trary position. In recent decisions on forum non conveniens, 
which the court has accepted as a matter of common law doc-
trine,3 it has reversed and disapproved of discretionary dis-
missals by trial courts,4 taking the stand that the sole fact 
that plaintiff is domiciled in California will ordinarily preclude 
forum non conveniens from applying. These decisions flatly 
contradict any notion that the balancing of conveniences test 
is constitutionally required in a case where defendant's con-
2. 1969 Report of the Judicial Coun- 4. Thomson v. Continental Ins. Co., 
cil of California, pp. 92, 96. 66 Cal.2d 738, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101, 427 
3. Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., P.2d 765 (1967); Goodwine v. Superior 
42 Cal.2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954). Court, 63 Cal.2d 481, 47 Cal. Rptr. 201, 
407 P.2d 1 (1965). 
16 CAL LAW 1970 
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tacts with the forum are otherwise sufficient to justify juris-
diction. 
Hopefully, the supreme court will take the earliest oppor-
tunity to clarify the Buckeye decision by adhering solely to the 
minimum contacts requirement and eliminating the balancing 
of conveniences as a separate test. 
D. Statutory Forum Non Conveniens 
As already noted, California has for a number of years for-
mally accepted the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a 
matter of common law.5 In recent decisions, the doctrine has 
been discussed at considerable length and in great detail. 6 
The question then arises as to why it was necessary to enact 
section 410.30 to deal with the same matter. One possibility 
is that the legislature felt that the doctrine had been applied in 
too restricted a fashion under past decisions. If so, the stat-
ute fails to accomplish the purpose, since it utilizes general 
language requiring court interpretation, and neither gives spe-
cific criteria to be followed in the future nor eliminates from 
consideration factors that have been considered important in 
the past. The major premises that have generally been rec-
ognized as controlling are: first, that dismissal is not proper 
unless all of the parties reside outside of the forum and the 
cause of action arose elsewhere,7 and second, that even then 
dismissal is disfavored. Coupled with a general reluctance 
on the part of local judges to apply the doctrine when, as a 
practical matter, it will force local attorneys to turn cases over 
to counsel in other states, the number of actions transferred 
has been small. When new section 410.30 becomes effective, 
the Supreme Court will undoubtedly have an opportunity to 
review the past practice and broaden its scope. Hopefully, 
the court will urge trial judges to be more flexible and to order 
5. Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 
42 Cal.2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954). 
6. ThQmson v. Continental Ins. Co., 
66 Cal.2d 738, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101, 427 
P.2d 765 (1967); Goodwine v. Superior 
Court, 63 Cal.2d 481, 47 Cal. Rptr. 201, 
407 P.2d 1 (1965). 
CAL LAW 1970 
7. See 1969 Report of the ludicial 
Council of California, pp. 92-95; Thom-
son v. Continental Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 
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the action moved where justice so demands, particularly in 
cases where the only major ground for retention of the suit is 
that plaintiff is a local resident. 
Section 410.30 can have significance only if it is read to-
gether with new section 410.10 as establishing a whole new 
approach t6 jurisdiction in California. Retention of an in-
appropriate case solely because plaintiff resides in the forum 
is every bit as stultifying as the old laws that allowed plaintiff 
to bring suit only where defendant could be found. 
E. New Methods of Serving Process 
From a practical point of view, the new statutes involving 
methods of service of process will have a greater impact on 
most practicing attorneys than will the new jurisdictional stat-
utes. The purpose of these new statutes is to remove tech-
nical, unrealistic requirements in favor of simpler, less ex-
pensive methods that will be at least as effective in providing 
actual notice of suit to defendants. 
As one might expect, the statute retains the traditional serv-
ice by personal delivery of the complaint and summons to the 
defendant.s In addition, the statute continues the practice 
regarding special statutes, such as the nonresident motor ve-
hicle law that has its own built-in provisions for service.9 
However, there are several important innovations. Un-
der new section 415.30, service may be made by mail on a 
form set out in the statute that requires the defendant to sign 
an "Acknowledgment of Receipt of Summons" and return it 
in a self-addressed, stamped envelope provided by plaintiff. 
If a party fails to sign the "Acknowledgment," he may be re-
quired to pay the reasonable costs incurred by plaintiff in 
making service by another method, regardless of who wins the 
case. Section 415.30 has a number of substantial advan-
tages. In suits against those stable, responsible defendants 
who accept whatever process is sought to be served on them, 
the procedure will simply save plaintiffs the cost of a process 
8. This is provided by new § 415.10. otherwise provided by statute, a sum-
9. This is accomplished by new mons shall be served (as follows) .... " 
§ 413.10, which states: "Except as 
18 CAL LAW 1970 
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server. As to actions against certain oft-served defendants 
whose attitude is to make all aspects of the suit, including 
service, as difficult as possible, the usual harassing tactics will 
cost money and are likely to be avoided. As to those potential 
defendants who flee to avoid service, the new provision will 
make little difference except that if these defendants are even-
tually served, plaintiff will be able to recoup some of the ex-
penses of the chase. The provision does have one potential 
drawback regarding the ignorant, but honest, individual de-
fendant who is likely not to read such a legal form sent by 
unregistered mail, but simply to dispose of it. Service on such 
defendants by a process server underscores the importance of 
the documents and induces them to seek proper assistance. 
Under the new "Acknowledgment" provision, courts have 
discretion in the awarding of the costs of direct service.10 This 
discretion will have to be exercised in favor of those whose 
unfamiliarity with the judicial system and judicial language 
has caused them to ignore the required action. Otherwise, 
the new procedure will become an instrument of oppres-
SIOn. 
Another equally important provision is section 415.40, 
which not only permits service on persons outside the state by 
personal delivery of the summons and complaint to them, but 
also allows service by airmail so long as a return receipt is 
required. The only unfortunate aspect of this statute is that 
it was not drawn to apply to in-state defendants as well. 
There is no just reason why the mails cannot be utilized for all 
service, provided defendants are forced to sign receipts for the 
letters. Such service is superior to personal delivery, since 
there rarely will be a serious question whether or not service 
was in fact made when defendant's signature appears on a 
receipt. When service, or purported service, is evidenced only 
by the affidavit of the individual who claims he made the serv-
ice, a difficult factual question may ensue. Sometimes de-
fendants, particularly the poor and ignorant, are the victims 
of so-called "sewer service" whereby the process server fal-
10. Section 415.30(d) permits recoy- show good cause for not signing the 
ery of expenses unless defendant can "Acknowledgment." 
CAL LAW 1970 19 
19
Friedenthal: Civil Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Civil Procedure 
sHies an affidavit stating that he made service that he in fact 
never made. ll 
A third new provision in the codeI2 further eases the method 
of serving corporations and associations. As in the past, 
service must be made on certain designated officers or agents. 
However, not only may such a person be served under the new 
provisions discussed above, but he may also be served simply 
by leaving one copy of the summons and complaint with the 
person who appears to be in charge of his office and mailing 
another copy to him at his office. Obviously, such a provision 
makes a great deal of sense. There is no need for the frustra-
tion that occurs when the person on whom service must be 
made is never present, at least according to his secretary, when 
the process server arrives. The only proper consideration is 
whether the individual is in fact notified of the action; the 
new provisions ensure that he is. 
F. A New Provision Regarding the Time To Answer 
Another new enactment worthy of note is section 412.20 
(3), which requires an answer to be filed within 30 days of 
service, regardless of where defendant resides. Previously 
the law required an answer within 10 days if defendant resided 
in the county in which the action was brought; otherwise, the 
30-day rule applied. I3 Practically speaking, 10 days is rarely 
sufficient time for the average citizen to hire an attorney, re-
late all the facts, and have an answer drafted, signed, and filed. 
If he does obtain counsel within the period, invariably the 
lawyers will agree to an extension. If defendant fails to 
obtain an attorney in time, and a quick default judgment is 
taken, a timely motion to set it aside will rarely be denied. 
G. Conclusion 
All in all, the new statutes are fair and reasonable and con-
stitute a significant improvement over the provisions they re-
11. For an interesting discussion of 
the problem, see Abuse of Process, 
Sewer Service, 3 Colum. J. of L. & Soc. 
Probs. 17 (1967). 
20 
12. Code of Civ. Pro. § 41S.20(a). 
13. Code of Civ. Pro. § 407(3). 
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place. That there are a number of sections that require court 
interpretation is clear; it is to be hoped that, when the cases 
arise, the courts will take extreme care in writing their deci-
sions in order that the general purposes of the new statutes 
will not be thwarted and that unnecessary technicalities and 
oppression will be avoided. 
II. Creditors' Remedies 
Developments made this last term in the California law of 
preliminary and post-judgment remedies are of great practical 
significance and are in line with recent changes in this field 
throughout the nation. Perhaps the most important changes 
are those regarding the constitutional validity of preliminary 
remedies heretofore granted on application of a plaintiff with-
out a prior hearing either as to the necessity of the remedy 
or the merits of the case. 
Preliminary relief is granted in order to preserve the status 
quo; so that by the time plaintiff wins his suit, if he does, his 
victory will not have been rendered meaningless through the 
actions of the defendant. Difficulty exists because such rem-
edies may be unjust to the defendant, particularly if he is in 
the right. At the very least, defendant will have lost the tem-
porary use of his property or his freedom to act, and this could 
cost him dearly if it interferes with his normal business or 
family life. Sometimes, the pressures that arise when one is 
subject to such remedies make it necessary for defendant to 
concede the lawsuit, even though he has a good defense. In 
essence, then, preliminary remedies can be an instrument of 
legalized blackmail.14 
In a very recent opinion, Sniadach v. Family Finance 
Corp./5 the United States Supreme Court struck down as un-
constitutional a Wisconsin statute permitting prejudgment 
garnishment of defendant's wages. The Wisconsin provision, 
14. See Brunn, Wage Garnishment 15. 395 U.S. 337, 23 L.Ed.2d 349, 
in California: A Study and Recom- 89 S.Ct. 1820 (1969). 
mendatiolls, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 1214 at 
1229-31 (1965); Comment, 43 Wash. 
L. Rev. 743 at 753 (1968). 
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like that of California16 and other states, failed to provide for 
a hearing prior to seizure of the wages. Unlike California's 
wage attachment law,17 the Wisconsin law did not even provide 
for pregarnishment notification to the alleged debtor. The 
Court noted the tremendous hardships that could obtain when 
a person was suddenly cut off from his wages, and held that 
for a court to do so without prior notice and hearing was a 
taking of property without due process as proscribed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Left open was the question as to 
what extent the decision applied to the attachment of other 
property or to other preliminary remedies, although it did 
note that there might be extraordinary circumstances where a 
summary preliminary remedy would be upheld. The court 
also failed to define the nature and purpose of a pregarnish-
ment hearing. The court indicated that defendant should have 
an opportunity "to tender any defense he may have, whether it 
be fraud or otherwise,,,18 but gave no clue as to the result of 
such a tender. Must the court be convinced that plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail before permitting garnishment or is it 
merely enough that he has filed in good faith? Should it delve 
into the necessity for the wage garnishment as opposed to 
other methods by which plaintiff might ensure that he could 
ultimately collect on a judgment? These were questions left 
unanswered. 
Largely because of its uncertainty, the Sniadach ruling has 
caused considerable confusion in the California trial courts 
regarding the validity of prejudgment attachments. Courts in 
different counties have taken varying positions on the matter. I9 
16. See Code of Civ. Pro. § 537. 
17. Code of Civ. Pro. § 690.11. The 
California law does not, however, re-
quire notice to the debtor prior to at-
tachment of property other than wages. 
18. 395 U.S. 339, 23 L.Ed.2d 349, 
89 S.Ct. 1820 (1969). 
19. In McCallop v. Universal Ac-
ceptance Corp., No. 605038 (Super. 
Ct. S.F., July 11, 1969), aff'd, McCallop 
v. Carberry, 1 Cal.3d 903, 83 Cal. Rptr. 
666, 464 P.2d 122 (1970), the Superior 
22 
Court of San Francisco County enjoined 
the county sheriff from any further wage 
attachments and also ordered him to re-
turn all moneys held by virtue of such 
levies already served. In certain other 
counties, the writs of attachment have 
been issued, but upon objection by the 
debtor, they have been quashed im-
mediately. Of course, if the debtor is 
not represented by counsel and has no 
notion of his rights, the attachments 
would continue in force. Compare 
Nebin v. West Coast Trailer Sales, No. 
CAL LAW 1970 
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Recently, the State Attorney General filed an action in the 
supreme court to declare all prejudgment attachment pro-
ceedings invalid, arguing that the Sniadach case should not 
only be applied to wage attachment but to attachment of other 
property as well. Two related cases were joined for argu-
ment, and all three cases were decided on January 30, 1970.20 
Unfortunately, these decisions continued to leave open many 
important questions. The court did holdl that prejudgment 
wage attachment under the current California statute was in-
valid under Sniadach, but the Attorney General's case, which 
was the only one that dealt with other forms of attachment, 
was dismissed on procedural grounds with no discussion of 
the merits whatsoever. 2 As a result, the confusion as to pre-
judgment attachment continues to exist, not only to the dis-
comfort of litigants and their attorneys, but also to the dis-
pleasure of county clerks and sheriff's personnel. And such 
uncertainty is not confined only to attachment. In a recent 
superior court decision in Los Angeles,3 for example, the 
trial judge upset traditional practices by holding the prelimi-
nary remedy of claim and delivery unconstitutional, since it 
permitted a sheriff forcibly to seize propeny held by defendant 
upon a claim of ownership by plaintiff without affording a 
prior hearing to defendant. And in another case now pending 
in the court of appeal,4 appellant has challenged the validity 
of Code of Civil Procedure section 1166a, which at the time 
the matter was heard below, 5 permitted a landlord in an un-
59, 184, North Orange Judicial District, 
Orange County, wherein an attachment 
was processed through the Santa Rosa 
County Sheriff's Department that placed 
a "keeper" in the defendant's place of 
business on November 12, 1969, two 
days before the summons and com-
plaint were served. 
20. People ex reI. Lynch v. Supe-
rior Court, No. L.A. 29661 (1970); 
McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Ca1.3d 903, 83 
Cal. Rptr. 66, 464 P.2d 122 (1970); 
Cline v Credit Bureau of Santa Clara 
Valley, 1 Ca1.3d 908, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669, 
464 P.2d 125 (1970). 
1. McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Ca1.3d 
CAL. LAW 1970 
903, 83 Cal. Rptr. 66, 464 P.2d 122; 
Cline v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara 
Valley, 1 Cal.3d 908, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669, 
464 P.2d 125 (1970). 
2. People ex reI. Lynch v. Superior 
Court, 1 Cal.3d 910, 83 Cal. Rptr. 670, 
464 P.2d 126 (1970). 
3. Blair v. Pitchess, No. 942,966, 
(Super. Ct. Los Angeles, October 21, 
1969). 
4. Vavrousek v. Bery, No. 26049, 
Dist. Ct. App., 1st App. Dist., June 21, 
1968. 
5. Section 1166a has since been 
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lawful detainer action to obtain immediate possession of the 
premises merely on ex parte showing that the tenant either was 
insolvent or did not have property subject to execution suffi-
cient to satisfy plaintiff's alleged damages.6 The final resolu-
tion of the problems involved in each of the above cases will 
be of immediate interest and significance to virtually all Cal-
ifornia attorneys. 
Even prior to the Sniadach decision, the California su-
preme court, in In re Harris,7 dealt with a similar problem in-
volving the preliminary remedy of civil arrest. The decision 
does not have a substantial direct impact since civil arrest is 
rarely utilized, but the philosophy of the Court is in line with 
the Sniadach decision. The Harris case presented a partic-
ularly offensive example of injustice. The plaintiff creditor 
brought suit to recover a truck purchased by defendant under 
an instalment sales contract. Plaintiff attempted to obtain 
immediate possession of the truck by claim and delivery but 
the sheriff was unable to locate the vehicle. Plaintiff, acting 
pursuant to the civil arrest statutes, filed an affidavit stating 
that defendant had concealed the truck to prevent the sheriff 
from finding it. The court ordered the sheriff to arrest defend-
ant and fixed bail at $16,000. In addition, the court saddled 
defendant with a $4,000 penalty assessment, which, as the su-
preme court noted, was required only in criminal cases and 
was totally inappropriate to civil arrest. Defendant did not 
have funds to meet the bailor to secure legal assistance and, as 
a result, spent five weeks in jail without ever having been 
brought before the trial court. Finally, he was able to secure 
representation from the Public Defender, who had the bail 
ant with the right to both notice and a 
hearing before a writ of possession is 
granted. The scope of the hearing is 
not clearly delineated, but appears to be 
limited to the question of the defend-
ant's ability to pay a judgment to plain-
tiff if one is awarded. Whether de-
fendant must also be entitled to be 
heard on the merits of plaintiff's claim 
is a question clearly raised by the 
Sniadach opinion. 
24 
6. Appellant relied in part on a 1937 
decision by a three-judge municipal 
court in San Francisco in Dillon v. 
Cockrell, No. 109588, (San Francisco 
Mun. Ct. 1937), which held c.c.P. 
§ 1166a unconstitutional. See The Re-
corder p. I, col. 5, and p. 8, col. 1, 
September 22, 1937. 
7. 69 Cal.2d 486, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340, 
446 P.2d 148 (1968). 
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and penalty assessment reduced to $1,250. Defendant was 
then able to secure a bond for that amount and obtain his 
release. The supreme court held that the civil arrest statutes 
were in violation of the due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
Section 13 of the California Constitution in that the statutes 
did not require notification to defendant of his right to apply 
to the trial court at any time for his release or for a reduction 
in bail, and, further, that they did not provide him with coun-
sel, since he was indigent. As the supreme court quite prop-
erly noted, a person charged with a criminal offense is entitled 
to these basic rights and it would be absurd to hold that a 
person under civil arrest was entitled to less. 
The ultimate result of the cases in both federal and state 
courts must be a total reappraisal by the California legislature 
of the procedural aspects of the preliminary remedy statutes. 
Hopefully, however, such a reappraisal will also involve the 
substantive aspects of these provisions; lately, much has been 
written regarding their efficacy and the justification for them,S 
and both Congress and the California Legislature have been 
active in the area. Primary concern has centered around the 
question of what property should be exempt from attachment 
(both before and after trial) and, in particular, the extent to 
which a debtor's wages should be immune. At present, the 
California statute provides that one-half of all amounts earned 
within the 30 days prior to attachment are automatically 
exempt.9 The other half may be exempted to the extent that 
the debtor can show he requires such earnings to support his 
family in California. lo 
In 1968, the California Legislature passed a bill to exempt 
automatically all wages, only to have the bill vetoed by the 
8. See, Patterson, Forward: Wage 
Garnishment-An Extraordinary Rem-
edy Run Amuck, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 735 
( 1968); Seid, Necessaries-Common or 
Otherwise, 14 Hastings L.J. 28 (1962); 
Note, Wage Gal'llishment in Kentucky, 
57 Ky. L.J. 92 (1968); Comment, Wage 
Garnishment-The Contemporary Shy-
CAL LAW 1970 
lock's Pqund of Flesh, 40 Miss. L.J. 151 
(1968); Note, Garnishment Under the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act and 
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 
38 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 338 (1969). 
9. Code of Civ. Pro. § 690.11. 
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Governor. ll However, Congress has stepped in with a billl2 
that as of July 1, 1970, will limit wage attachments in every 
state to a maximum of 25 percent of net earnings. The im-
pact of the federal law in California may be greater than one 
might expect in light of California's law permitting the ex-
emption of even the second half of a debtor's wages. There 
are two reasons for this. First, a debtor in California must 
claim the extra exemption and if the plaintiff-creditor resists, 
the debtor must appear in court on the matter. l3 To many 
(>oor unsophisticated debtors, these procedures are unknown, 
and, even if known, appear so difficult that they will not be 
utilized. Second, there is an exception to the exemption that 
applies when the suit is to collect "debts (which) are . 
incurred by such debtor, his wife or family for the common 
necessaries of life."14 This exclusion is often applicable, even 
though such "necessaries" are narrowly defined to include only 
food, clothing, shelter, and medical expenses. l5 
An interesting controversy has arisen in recent California 
superior court decisions as to the scope of the "common nec-
essaries" exclusion, when a single suit is brought to collect for 
some items that are common necessaries and for some that are 
not. In Retailers Credit Assn. v. Davis/6 a case brought in 
Mendocino County by a collection agency to which a number 
of defendant's debts had been assigned, the court held that 
since some of the debts were not for necessaries, the exclusion 
did not apply at all. The judge relied solely on a literal read-
ing of the statute, and noted that the case was one of first im-
pression. To the contrary is Carpenter v. Trujillo/7 decided 
by the appellate department of the Santa Clara County Supe-
11. Assembly Bill 1208 was first in-
troduced on March 26, 1968. The gov-
ernor vetoed the bill on September 3, 
1968. See From the Governor's Office, 
California Digest, p. 83, October, 1968. 
12. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 
§§ 303-307, 82 Stat. 146; 15 U.S.c. 
§ 1673-77 (1968). 
13. Code of Civ. Pro. § 690.26. 
14. Code of Civ. Pro. § 690.11. A 
similar exclusion applies to debts "in-
26 
curred for personal services rendered 
by an employee, or former employee of 
such debtor." 
15. See Los Angeles Finance Co. v. 
Flores, 110 Cal. App.2d Supp. 850, 
243 P.2d 139 (1952). 
16. No. 25884 (Super. Ct., Mendo-
cino County, Feb. 14, 1968). 
17. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 725 (1969). 
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rior Court, where, again, a collection agency brought a single 
suit to collect on a number of obligations incurred by defend-
ant, some for necessaries and some not. The court noted 
that had separate suits been brought to collect for the neces-
saries, the exclusion would clearly have applied; thus, it 
seemed illogical to find the exclusion inapplicable merely 
because plaintiff consolidated claims for all debts into a 
single suit for purposes of convenience. The court also 
rejected defendant's alternative claim that the amount of the 
exclusion should be limited on an apportionment theory. It 
was argued that the court should figure what percentage of 
the claimed debts were for necessaries and exclude only that 
percentage of the second half of defendant's wages. Again, 
it was clear that such a formula would punish plaintiff for 
consolidating his claims in a single suit, since the full amount 
of the exclusion would be available if a separate action had 
been brought to recover for necessaries alone. 
There is no doubt that the Trujillo decision is correct from 
the point of view of sensible statutory construction, but until 
the definitive word on the matter is received from the Supreme 
court or the court of appeal, it is likely that some trial judges 
will read the exclusion clause to favor the debtor when-
ever conceivable, since they, along with many others, believe 
that common sense requires all earnings to be exempt from 
pre- or post-trial attachment. IS 
The general attitude of the courts in interpreting exemption 
statutes in favor of debtors is not new and is not confined to 
wage attachments. This was recently illustrated somewhat 
dramatically in Independence Bank v. Heller/9 in which the 
court was called upon to interpret Code of Civil Procedure 
section 690.2, which exempts from pre- or post-trial attach-
ment the following possessions: 
Necessary household, table, and kitchen furniture be-
longing to the judgment debtor, including one refrig-
erator, washing machine, sewing machine, stove, stove-
pipes and furniture; wearing apparel, beds, bedding and 
18. See generally authorities cited 19. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal 
supra, n. 8. Rptr. 868 (1969). 
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bedsteads, hanging pictures, oil paintings and drawings 
drawn or painted by any member of the family, and 
family portraits and their necessary frames, provisions 
and fuel actually provided for individual or family use, 
sufficient for three months, and three cows and their 
suckling calves, four hogs and their suckling pigs, and 
food for such cows and hogs for one month; also one 
radio, one television receiver, one piano, one shotgun and 
one rifle. 
Plaintiff had secured a judgment from defendant in excess 
of $80,000 and sought to levy on defendant's household 
goods, allegedly worth over $22,000. Defendant claimed 
such goods were exempt under section 690.2; plaintiff alleged 
that such valuable furniture was not "necessary" within the 
meaning of the law. The trial judge granted the exemption 
and the court of appeal affirmed. The court reaffirmed the 
rules that exemption statutes are to be construed favorably to 
the debtor and that what is necessary to a person is a function 
of the style of living to which he has become accustomed. Un-
derlying the court's decision was also the practical considera-
tion that the trial judge should not be required to make an 
item by item determination of what articles "meet the mini-
mum requirements of an adequately furnished home." It was 
sufficient that the court simply determine that all items ex-
empted were those that defendant had used to furnish his home 
in the manner to which he had long been accustomed. 
The Heller decision points up an interesting dilemma. On 
the one hand, it is in the interest of sound economic and social 
policy, if not in the interest of humanity, to apply exemption 
laws broadly so that those in debt do not find their lives and 
the lives of the members of their families utterly destroyed. 
Without such protection, a harassed debtor is likely to run 
off, leaving his wife and children alone to face a wealth of 
economic and emotional problems, the financial burden of 
which will be borne ultimately by the state. On the other 
hand, it is most galling to find that some few persons can, by 
manipulation of the laws, maintain an extremely high standard 
of living, while at the same time they mock their fellow citi-
28 CAL LAW 1970 
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zens by ducking their obligations. One attempt to curb these 
abuses was contained in a bill introduced into the California 
Legislature on April 7, 1969.20 It would have amended sec-
tion 690.2, to allow exemption of the listed household items 
only to a total maximum cash value of $3,000. Although 
the proposal would effectively have barred the debtor in Heller 
from avoiding attachment, such a provision does pose many 
problems. For one thing, in a state as large and as varied as 
California, $3,000 may be quite adequate in some com-
munities and totally deficient in others. Moreover, the legis-
lature must constantly reconsider such a statute as the cost 
of living fluctuates. Perhaps what is needed is a more gen-
erous limit, e.g., $10,000, which few could claim was too low. 
Such a provision would effectively shut off the exemption to 
those few wealthy persons who would seek to preserve the 
bulk of their assets by investing in expensive household items, 
and would at the same time avoid placing on the courts an 
untenable burden of determining the value of household goods 
in a large number of cases. 
III. Scope of Cross Actions 
Confusion regarding the scope of counterclaims and cross-
complaints under the California Code of Civil Procedure is 
hardly new. The trouble primarily stems from the fact that 
a cross-action by defendant can be either a counterclaim or 
a cross-complaint, depending on the circumstances, and each 
has different consequences. A cross-complaint1 is any claim 
by defendane that arises out of the same transaction or occur-
rence as does plaintiff's complaint. It is treated as a separate 
20. Assembly Bill 1715 (1969). 
1. Code of Civ. Pro. § 442 defines 
a cross complaint as follows: "When-
ever the defendant seeks affirmative 
relief against any person, whether or 
not a party to the original action, re-
lating to or depending upon the con-
tract, transaction, matter, happening 
or accident upon which the action is 
brought or affecting the property to 
CAL LAW 1970 
which the action relates, he may, in 
addition to his answer, file at the same 
time, or by permission of the court 
subsequently, a cross-complaint." 
2. Throughout the text, it is as-
sumed that each cross-complaint is 
brought against the plaintiff in the ac-
tion. In fact, a cross-complaint may 
be asserted against anyone, whether or 
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action,3 and defendant always has the option of asserting it 
as a cross-complaint or making it the basis of a separate suit.4 
A counterclaim,5 on the other hand, is a claim by defendant 
that tends to diminish or defeat plaintiff's claim.6 It is treated 
as a defense to plaintiff's claim;7 while it does not need to arise 
out of the same transaction or occurrence as plaintiff's claim, 
if it does, it is a compulsory counterclaim.8 Thus, defendant 
must assert it as a counterclaim; he will be held barred from 
asserting it later as a basis for an independent action.9 
It is obvious, then, that the meaning of the phrase "diminish 
or defeat" is vital. On it may depend whether or not a former 
defendant who failed to countersue against plaintiff, is forever 
barred from asserting an otherwise valid claim. In the ordi-
nary action, it is now clear that if plaintiff seeks a judgment 
that includes any money damages whatsoever, then any claim 
by defendant that also seeks judgment for damages, alone or 
3. See Wettstein v. Cameto, 61 Cal. 
2d 838, 40 Cal. Rptr. 705, 395 P.2d 665 
(1964) (failure to answer cross-com-
plaint results in judgment by default). 
4. See Sawyer v. Sterling Realty Co., 
41 Cal. App.2d 715, 721, 107 P.2d 449 
(1940). 
S. Code of Civ. Pro. § 438, reads as 
follows: 
Counterclaim; elements; when au-
thorized. The counterclaim mentioned 
in § 437 must tend to diminisjl or de-
feat the plaintiff's recovery and must 
exist in favor of a defendant and 
against a plaintiff between whom a sev-
eral judgment might be had in the ac-
tion; provided, that the right to main-
tain a counterclaim shall not be affected 
by the fact that either plaintiff's or de-
fendant's claim is secured by mortgage 
or otherwise, nor by the fact that the 
action is brought, or the counterclaim 
maintained, for the foreclosure of such 
security; and provided further, that the 
court may, in its discretion, order the 
counterclaim to be tried separately from 
the claim of the plaintiff. 
6. Note that there is an additional 
30 
requirement that a several judgment 
must be available between plaintiff and 
defendant. See Code of Civ. Pro. § 438. 
This means that defendant's claims 
must be asserted by him in the same 
capacity in which it is alleged his ob-
ligations to plaintiff arose. See Carey 
v. Cusack, 245 Cal. App.2d 57, 67, 54 
Cal. Rptr. 244 (1966). 
7. See, e.g., Edgar Rice Burroughs, 
Inc. v. Commodore Productions and 
Artists Inc., 167 Cal. App.2d 463, 
474, 334 P.2d 922 (1959) (coun-
terclaim treated like affirmative de-
fenses for pleading purposes). 
8. Code of Civ. Pro. § 439 reads as 
follows: 
Counterclaim; failure to assert; ef-
fect. If the defendant omits to set up 
a counterclaim upon a cause arising out 
of the transaction set forth in the com-
plaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's 
claim, neither he nor his assignee can 
afterwards maintain an action against 
the plaintiff therefor. 
9. See, e.g., Saunders v. New Capital 
for Small Businesses, Inc., 231 Cal. 
App.2d 324, 41 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1964). 
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with other relief, will be held to "diminish or defeat" within the 
meaning of the statute.10 Other than in cases involving mutual 
claims for damages, however, defendant's cross action will 
not normally satisfy the "diminish or defeat" requirement. ll 
For example, if plaintiff seeks only an injunction or the can-
cellation of a contract, defendant's suit for damages will not 
suffice.12 
Recent court of appeal opinions show there is one im-
portant type of case where a substantial question still exists 
as to whether even mutual claims for monetary relief can 
satisfy the "diminish or defeat" requirement. This situation 
arises where recovery by defendant on his countersuit would 
necessarily preclude recovery by plaintiff on his claim. 
In Olson v. County of Sacramento/3 plaintiff brought suit 
for damages incurred when defendant county cancelled plain-
tiff's exclusive garbage franchise. The county defended on 
the ground that plaintiff had obtained the franchise through 
fraud, and, on the same facts, sought to recover payments 
made to plaintiff under the franchise prior to the time of can-
cellation. In the court's opinion, citing no authorities, defend-
ant's cross action did not satisfy the "diminish or defeat" re-
quirement of the counterclaim statute because plaintiff and 
defendant could not both be successful.14 Recovery by one 
necessarily precluded recovery by the other. 
On the basis of this interpretation, it would seem clear that 
10. See 2 Witkin, California Pro-
cedure, Pleading § 580 (1954), and 
cases cited therein. 
11. Zainudin v. Meizel, 119 Cal. 
App.2d 265, 259 P.2d 460 (1953); But 
see Hill v. Snidow, 100 Cal. App.2d 
37, 222 P.2d 962 (1950). 
12. See Zainudin v. Meizel, supra, 
note 11. 
13. 274 Cal. App.2d -,79 Cal. Rptr. 
140 (1969). 
14. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
140, 144 (1969). It is interesting to 
speculate why the court felt it nec-
essary to determine whether the claim 
CAL. LAW 1970 
qualified as a cross-complaint or as a 
counterclaim. The issue in question 
was whether the cross-action, on its 
face, was barred by the statute of lim-
itations, and if so, whether defendant 
should have been given leave to amend 
to avoid the limitations problem. The 
court gives no clue as to what differ-
ence it would make if the cross-action 
were a counterclaim instead of a cross-
complaint. Cases seem to afford them 
equal treatment in this area. Compare 
Stephans v. Herman, 225 Cal. App.2d 
671,675, 37 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1964), with 
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in a typical auto accident case in which plaintiff seeks damages 
based on defendant's negligence, defendant's own claim based 
on plaintiff's negligence could not qualify as a counterclaim. 
However, in Manning v. Wymer15 and in a number of earlier 
cases that it cites,16 the courts seem to have reached exactly 
the opposite conclusion. In each of these cases, the court 
assumed, without discussing the "diminish or defeat require-
ment," that such a claim by defendant would qualify as a 
counterclaim; the question actually determined was whether, 
on the particular facts of each case, the compulsory counter-
claim rule applied. As a practical matter, it seems clear that 
in most cases where victory by one party on his claim neces-
sarily precludes victory by his opponent on his, the two claims 
will involve the same transaction or occurrence; thus, the ques-
tion whether defendant's claim is a counterclaim takes on add-
ed significance, for if the answer is "yes," it would be com-
pulsory. 
An analysis of the history of the California counterclaim 
statute does not solve the uncertainty over the meaning of the 
"diminish or defeat" requirement. At common law there was 
no counterclaim as such, although a defendant, in certain 
cases, was entitled to make claims against the plantiff.17 Thus, 
if defendant had a claim arising from the same transaction as 
that of plaintiff, he could seek "recoupment"; otherwise, if 
both plaintiff and defendant had liquidated claims based on 
contract, defendant could plead "set-off." Under both recoup-
ment and set-off, which were treated as defenses, defendant 
could not obtain affirmative recovery;18 the best he could do 
15. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. 
Rptr. 600 (1969) (dictum). The court 
held that since a prior action brought 
by defendant was settled expressly 
without prejudice to plaintiff's main-
taining the current suit, defendant could 
not claim that the current action was 
a compUlsory counterclaim in that first 
action. 
16. Schrader v. Neville, 34 Cal.2d 
112, 207 P.2d 1057 (1949) (defendant's 
claim treated as compulsory in making 
award of costs of suit); Artucovich v. 
32 
Arizmendiz, 256 Cal. App.2d 130, 134, 
63 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1967), see 
Friedenthal, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1969 
Cal Law-Trends and Developments 
191 at 234; Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal 
App.2d 613, 343 P.2d 977 (1959). 
17. See N.Y. Judicial Council, Sec-
ond Report, pp. 124-126 (1936); 
Howell, Counterclaims and Cross-Com-
plaints in California, 10 So. Cal. L. Rev. 
415-418 (1937). 
18. See Howell, supra, note 17 at 
416; Loyd, The Development of Set-
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was to reduce the amount that plaintiff would otherwise re-
cover. It is obvious, then, that if the parties' respective claims 
were such that recovery by one would preclude recovery by 
the other, neither recoupment nor set-off was available. 
California's original counterclaim statutes,t9 enacted in 
1851, followed the common-law approach closely. Defendant 
was permitted to counterclaim only on the following: 
1 st. A cause of action arising out of the transaction set 
forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's 
claim, or connected with the subject of the action; 
2nd. In an action arising upon contract, any other 
cause of action arising also upon contract, and existing 
at the commencement of the action. 
In 1927, this section was amended to broaden the scope of 
counterclaims but preserved the flavor of the original provision 
by incorporating the "diminish or defeat" requirement. 2o The 
historical picture is complicated by the fact that in 1851, and 
ever since, California, by an entirely separate enactment, l has 
provided: 
If a counterclaim, established at the trial, exceed the 
plaintiff's demand, judgment for the defendant must be 
given for the excess; or if it appears that the defendant 
is entitled to any other affirmative relief, judgment must 
be given accordingly. 
This provision could be construed in two ways. On the one 
hand, it could simply be held to mean that if a counterclaim 
is otherwise valid, that is, meets the common law require-
ments, defendant can obtain an affirmative judgment if the 
verdict on the counterclaim exceeds plaintiff's verdict. 2 On 
Of}, 64 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541 at 552-53 
(1916). 
19. Cal. Stats. 1851, Ch. 5, §§ 46-47. 
20. Obviously, the "diminish or de-
feat" language could have no purpose 
other than to retain residual aspects of 
the common-law set-off rule incorpo-
rated in the second paragraph of the 
1851 provision. 
CAL LAW 1970 
1. Code of Civ. Pro. § 666. 
2. The California courts have never 
had difficulty with the situation where 
a mutual recovery is possible but where 
plaintiff simply fails to establish his 
claim at trial; in those circumstances, 
defendant is universally permitted to 
collect the full amount of his counter-
claim without question. See Tomales 
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the other hand, the statute could be read to work a funda-
mental change from the common law by redefining the scope 
of a counterclaim to permit recovery by defendant even though 
such recovery is exclusive of victory by plaintiff. If the latter 
were the proper interpretation, it would strongly indicate that 
the "diminish or defeat" language, when subsequently enacted, 
was not intended as a reinstitution of old common law require-
ments. Unfortunately, there is no clue whatever as to which 
of the two possible interpretations was intended, either in 
1851, at the time the statute was first enacted, or at any sub-
sequent reenactment. 
Analysis of the wording of the "diminish or defeat" clause 
itself also provides little assistance in determining its precise 
meaning. On the one hand, "defeat" could merely be con-
sidered the ultimate of "diminish"; both would thus refer only 
to the amount of plaintiff's recovery, not to his right to recover. 
On the other hand, "defeat" could be read to mean anything 
that precluded plaintiff's recovery, including any counterclaim, 
which, if successful, would necessarily mean that plaintiff's 
claim would fail. Although the language "diminish or defeat" 
appeared in the New York code revision of 1877 and was ap-
plied to various types of counterclaim statutes elsewhere even 
in the absence of specific statutory language,3 there are few 
authorities that deal with the particular problem of interpreta-
tion before us. When they do, the answer is usually assumed 
rather than discussed. For example, in Stevenson v. Devins,4 
which on its facts is closely akin to Olson v. County of Sac-
ramento,5 plaintiff sued to cancel a contract and obtain moneys 
paid under it on the ground that he was fraudulently induced 
to enter into the contract. Defendants counterclaimed for 
moneys due them under the terms of the contract. The court 
upheld the counterclaim, but although it noted in passing the 
Bay Oyster Corp. v. Superior Court, 35 
Cal.2d 389, 217 P.2d 968 (1950). See 
also Code of Civ. Pro. § 581(5) which 
provides that a counterclaim shall re-
main pending despite the fact that plain-
tiff's complaint is dismissed with prej-
udice. 
34 
3. Clark, Code Pleading, p. 650 (2d 
ed., 1947). 
4. 158 App. Div. 616, 143 N.Y.S. 
916 (1913). 
5. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
140 (1969). 
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existence of the "diminish or defeat" requirement, the sole 
discussion was whether the defendant's claim was "connected 
with the subject of [plaintiff's] . . . action" so that it could 
qualify as a counterclaim under the New York code. 
From a practical point of view, it is difficult to decide what 
interpretation of the "diminish or defeat" clause is more 
satisfactory. There is no need to read the provision broadly 
to permit defendant to assert all counteractions arising from 
the same transaction or occurrence as involved in plaintiff's 
complaint, since California's cross-complaint statute already 
encompasses all such counteractions. Thus, the only major 
question is to what extent such counteractions should be com-
pulsory. The interest of the efficient administration of justice, 
requiring all parties to bring their related claims together in 
a single action, has substantial advantages. If special circum-
stances so direct, the trial court is always free to hold separate 
trials on the various claims.6 
The California situation is unique, since the statutes do not 
require that defendant assert every cross-complaint he has 
against plaintiff, even though, by definition, a cross-complaint 
is related to plaintiff's complaint. The distinction between 
compulsory counterclaims and cross-complaints makes little 
sense. As long as there is confusion as to when defendant's 
claim is a counterclaim and when it is a cross-complaint, there 
is danger that a defendant or his counsel will be misled and 
will fail to assert a claim, believing it to be a cross-complaint, 
only to find subsequent action on it barred because it was 
in fact a counterclaim. 
There is but one adequate solution. California must do 
as most other major jurisdictions have done;7 it must complete-
ly rewrite its archaic counterclaim and cross-complaint laws 
to throw off all traces of the common law and to achieve a 
sensible, efficient, and just set of cross-action rules. 
6. See Code of Civ. Pro. §§ 438, 
1048. 
7. For a comparison of the practice 
under California statutes with that un-
der Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which has been 
CAL LAW 1970 
adopted in many states, see Comment, 
I U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 547 (1954). See 
also 3 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New 
York Civil Practice §§ 3019.01-3019-
.02, for an analysis of the evolution 
of the Modern New York provisions. 
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IV. Discovery 
A major policy question concerning pretrial procedure 
is the extent to which discovery should be available to a poten-
tial plaintiff prior to his initiation of suit. Pretrial discovery 
would aid a potential plaintiff in determining whether he has a 
valid cause of action. Modern rules generally do not permit 
any discovery until an action has actually been filed. An ex-
ception to the general rule, as embodied in Code of Civil 
Procedure section 2017,8 is almost universally permitted in 
situations where it is necessary to preserve testimony for a 
potential action that cannot, for some reason, be immediately 
commenced. 
To what extent can this exception be utilized to permit dis-
covery other than that which is a normal by-product of the 
preservation of evidence for use in a future trial? In Hunt-
Wesson Foods, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus,9 the court faced 
this question directly and held that section 2017 could not be 
used for discovery purposes. The potential "case" was an 
administrative hearing before a county board of supervisors on 
a tax assessment.10 It was conceded that the depositions 
sought to be taken would under no circumstances be admis-
sible at the hearing; the sole purpose of discovery would be 
to enable the party seeking discovery to prepare for the cross-
examination of the witnesses whose depositions were sought. 
The court held that such discovery would be beyond the "pres-
ent intention of the Legislature and the viewpoint of the 
courts." 
This interpretation seems correct in light of the language 
of section 2017, and the interpretations given to it and to 
8. Code of Civ. Pro. § 2017 reads 
as follows: Depositions before action 
or pending appeal. A person who de-
sires to perpetuate his own testimony 
or that of another person regarding any 
matter that may be cognizable in any 
court of this State may file a verified 
petition in the superior court in the 
county of the residence of any expected 
adverse party. 
36 
9. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 
832 (1969). 
10. The decision of the board could 
later be challenged in the local Superior 
Court, but the hearing would be based 
solely on the record of the board's pro-
ceedings. 
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Federal Rule 27, with which it is nearly identical. l1 The re-
quirements that petitioner show first that he cannot bring the 
suit for which perpetuation of testimony is sought and second 
that the evidence must be now obtained or it may be lost, are 
considered safeguards against an abuse of the provisions where 
a petitioner seeks merely to discover whether he has a valid 
cause of action.12 
From time to time, litigants have attempted to use the ordi-
nary rules of discovery to determine whether they have a valid 
cause of action. When brought prior to institution of an ac-
tion, these attempts are thwarted by the language of the rules 
that typically permit their use only after an action has been 
commenced.13 California goes even further by prohibiting 
discovery until summons has been served on the defendant 
or until he has appeared.14 
A possible means of circumventing the normal rule against 
preaction discovery exists when plaintiff, who is able to state 
a legitimate cause of action against one person, seeks discov-
ery in that action to determine whether he has another cause 
of action against that person or others. In Los Angeles Ceme-
tery Assn. v. Superior Court/5 plaintiff had purchased real 
estate after allegedly relying on false representations of de-
fendant that the lessee occupying the premises was financially 
stable. After the lessee defaulted in the payment of rent and 
went out of business, plaintiff sued defendant on a fraud 
theory. Subsequently, plaintiff amended its complaint to add 
a cause of action alleging that the lessee was a mere alter 
ego of the defendant, and that defendant was, therefore, liable 
for the unpaid rent. Defendant's demurrer to the new cause 
of action was sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff then 
served defendant with a set of interrogatories for the purpose 
11. E.g., Block v. Superior Court, 219 
Cal. App.2d 469, 477-78, 33 Cal. Rptr. 
205, 98 A.L.R.2d 901, 907-908 (1963); 
In re Gurnsey, 223 F.Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 
1963). 
12. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp. 
297 F.2d 49, 55 (9th Cir., 1961); Matter 
of Dallman, 1 Cal. Disc. Proc. 64 
(S.Ct. 1959). 
CAL LAW 1970 
13. See F.R.C.P. 26(a); Application 
of the Royal Bank of Canada, 33 F.R.D. 
296 (S.D.N.Y., 1963). 
14. Code of Civ. Pro. §§ 2016(a), 
2030(a), 2033. 
15. 268 Cal. App.2d 492, 74 Cal. 
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of enabling plaintiff to plead its alter ego theory with par-
ticularity. Defendant's refusal to answer the interrogatories 
was upheld by the trial court on the ground that discovery 
cannot be utilized to secure data on which a pleading may be 
based. The reviewing court issued a writ of mandate requir-
ing the trial court to order the defendant to answer the inter-
rogatories. The opinion of the court of appeal did not 
directly discuss whether discovery should be available before 
a satisfactory cause of action is stated. The court simply 
relied on the following factors: ( 1) a simple conclusionary 
allegation that defendant had entered into the rental contract 
would have been sufficient under California law to raise the 
alter ego theory; (2) if plaintiff had elected to proceed on such 
a simple allegation, his complaint would have been satisfac-
tory and the discovery in question would clearly have been 
permissible; (3) it was conceded that plaintiff intended to 
pursue the alter ego theory in good faith on the basis of some 
data that it had in its possession. What the court seems to 
be holding is that plaintiff in essence was seeking information 
not for purposes of determining whether he had a valid cause 
of action, but for purposes of trial preparation. The fact 
that plaintiff had not satisfactorily pleaded that cause of action 
was unimportant since he could easily do so in good faith. 
The Los Angeles Cemetery Assn. case points out clearly 
a serious anomaly. A potential plaintiff is entitled to dis-
covery only when he has some knowledge of the facts of his 
cause of action. When he merely suspects he has a cause but 
has no facts available and needs discovery the most, he cannot 
obtain it. 
The proscriptions on preaction discovery have a firm prac-
tical footing. Obviously, it would be unfortunate if any in-
dividual, merely by filing an intention to bring suit against 
another, were permitted to discover at will in the hope 
that he might find some basis for an action. The poten-
tial for harassment would be substantial.16 On the other hand, 
16. See MacLeod v. Superior Court, 
115 Cal. App.2d 180, 185, 251 P.2d 
728 (1952) (concurring opinion). 
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it would seem not only feasible, but appropriate, that for those 
special cases where a need for pre action discovery does exist, 
a special provision be enacted with adequate safeguards. 
Only a few years ago, New York adopted a rule17 pro· 
viding: 
Before an action is commenced, disclosure to aid in 
bringing an action, to preserve information or to aid in 
arbitration, may be obtained, but only by court order. 
Under this provision, discovery may be allowed to determine 
the identity of defendants against whom a cause of action lies 
or to discover the precise facts upon which the cause of action 
is based.Is 
Unfortunately, the language of the New York rule is very 
broad, and no limitations are spelled out. As a result, the 
New York courts have run into a problem of interpretation. 
Some decisions/9 for example, deny discovery unless plaintiff 
shows in his moving papers that he does in fact have a cause 
of action. This would seem to permit use of the rule only in 
rare cases where, though the existence of the cause is clear, 
plaintiff needs some specific facts to draft his complaint in 
proper form. Other courts20 and commentators, l however, 
seem to accept a less rigid position, and require only that there 
be "some probability that he may have a good cause of action 
and that he is not merely making a stab in the dark." This 
latter view is the only justifiable interpretation if the rule 
is to have any practical meaning, and should be written into 
the regulation, were it to be adopted in California. Apart 
from this problem, however, the New York courts do not seem 
to be troubled by the application of the rule. Attempted 
17. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3102(c). 
18. See, generally, 3 Weinstein, Korn 
& Miller, New York Civil Practice 
§§ 3102.07-3102.14. 
19. Application of Heller, 57 Misc. 
2d 976, 293 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Ct. Cl., 
1968); Application of Pelley, 43 Misc. 
2d 1082, 252 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Nassau 
County Ct., 1964). 
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20. See Application of Schenley In-
dustries, Inc., 25 App. Div.2d 742, 269 
N.Y.S.2d 276 (1966); Cotler v. Retail 
Credit Co., 18 App. Div.2d 898, 237 
N.Y.S.2d 781 (1963). 
1. 3 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New 
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abuses do appear in a few cases, but the courts easily control 
them merely by denying discovery.2 
There are several reasons why California should adopt a 
modified form of the New York rule. First, the current limita-
tions in California on preaction discovery can easily be cir-
cumvented by any member of the bar who in the face of the 
rules of ethics is willing to file a well-drafted, nondemurrable 
complaint based solely on hope and speculation, thus allowing 
him to engage in extensive discovery to determine whether 
his client does have a valid cause of action.3 Second, the rules 
unnecessarily frustrate the ethical attorney whose client 
strongly suspects that he has a valid claim but who has no way 
to ascertain the pertinent facts before filing suit, because all 
the relevant information is in the custody of the potential de-
fendant. 
It is somewhat anomalous that California should not have 
a more flexible provision regarding pre action discovery, since, 
prior to the adoption of the current discovery package in 
1958, the statutes regarding such preaction discovery4 were 
quite liberal. The former provisions permitting discovery for 
the perpetuation of testimony contained neither a requirement 
that a party show that he could not presently institute the suit 
nor a requirement that he show that unless the discovery was 
permitted, the evidence was likely to be unavailable at trial. 5 
As a result, in several cases, potential plaintiffs sought and 
were permitted to discover facts that would subsequently be 
the basis for their complaints.6 Although these provisions for 
presuit discovery did not receive widespread use,7 they were 
adversely criticized by courts8 and commentators9 for their 
2. See, e.g., Application of St. An-
drew Associates, 57 Misc.2d 1079, 294 
N.Y.S.2d 188 (N.Y. Cty, 1968). 
3. If he finds a cause somewhat dif-
ferent from that pleaded, he may then 
resort to California's liberal amend-
ment rules. See Code of Civ. Pro. § 
473. 
4. Code of Civ. Pro. §§ 2083-2090, 
repealed Cal. Stats. 1957, Ch. 1904, 
§ 1, p. 3321. 
40 
5. Comment, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 909 
at 926-29 (1956); 3 Stan. L. Rev. 530 
at 531 (1951). 
6. See 3 Stan. L. Rev. 530 at 534-35, 
and cases cited therein. 
7. See 3 Stan. L. Rev. at 534. 
8. See, e.g., MacLeod v. Superior 
Court, 115 Cal. App.2d 180, 185, 251 
P.2d 728 (1952) (concurring opinion). 
9. See, e.g., Committee on Admin-
istration of Justice, Report to the Board 
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potential for abuse and harassment. Therefore, when the 
modern federal rules were adopted in California, the more 
restrictive presuit perpetuation rules were adopted along with 
the more liberal rules providing for discovery after suit is filed. 
The advantages of the liberal presuit discovery provisions evi-
dently were ignored. 
Although it is clear that only a statutory alteration can now 
loosen the rigid presuit discovery rule of section 2017, the 
question raised in Los Angeles Cemetery Assn. v. Superior 
CoudfJ as to the scope of discovery once a complaint has 
been filed is still open. 
The permissible limits are defined by Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 2016 (b), which is nearly identical to Federal 
Rule 26 (b), as follows: 
. the deponent may be examined regarding any 
matter not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates 
to the claim or defense of the examining party, or to the 
claim or defense of any other party. . It is not 
ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmis-
sible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. . . . 
The Los Angeles Cemetery case stands at least for the prop-
osition that discovery can proceed under the above section 
when the cause of action to which it relates has been dis-
missed on demurrer subject to leave to amend, and a satis-
factory amendment is clearly available. Could the statute 
have been read even more broadly, to give the plaintiff the 
right to discover even when the very purpose of the discovery 
would be to determine whether facts exist to permit the amend-
ment? The case of Rossbach v. Superior Court,Il decided in 
1919, under the prior discovery rules, provides support for 
such an interpretation. There, as in the Los Angeles Ceme-
of Governors, Discovery, 31 St. B.l. 11. 43 Cal. App. 729, 185 P. 879 
204 at 206-07 (1956). (1919). 
10. 268 Cal. App.2d 492, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 97 (1968). 
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tery case, plaintiff sought to take depositions after a demurrer 
was sustained with leave to amend but before any amendment 
was filed. However, the court in Rossbach, unlike the Los 
Angeles Cemetery case, did not rely on the fact that a success-
ful amendment could have been filed at any time. Instead, 
it took the position that plaintiff had a right to discovery as 
soon as defendant was served and so long as the case was 
pending. The court held that discovery was not barred merely 
because the facts to which it might pertain were facts not 
formally in issue in the pleadings. 
The filing of the complaint constituted the bringing of 
the action . . . , and plaintiff's right to have a deposi-
tion depends not alone upon whether it is material to 
issues tendered thereby, but the right thereto is equally 
clear if it would be material to any possible issue raised 
by new allegations contained in an amended complaint 
which the court might properly permit plaintiff to file. 12 
Several other decisions, including some by the California 
Supreme Court/3 support this view. When the cases were de-
cided, the pertinent statute simply provided that a deposition 
could be taken "at any time after the service of summons or 
the appearance of the defendant, "14 and there were no stat-
utory prohibitions on the scope of the inquiry. Nevertheless, 
since the basic purpose of the new discovery acts was to 
broaden the existing scope of discovery, it has been held in-
appropriate to interpret the new laws as eliminating that which 
was permitted under the prior laws, without express language 
compelling such a result.15 
Very few cases dealing with the question have arisen under 
Federal Rule 26(b)/6 upon which section 2017(b) of the 
12. 43 Cal. App. 729, 731, 185 P. 
879, 880. 
13. See McClatchy Newspapers v. 
Superior Court, 26 Cal.2d 386, 394-96, 
159 P.2d 944 (1945), and cases cited 
therein. 
14. Furthermore, the same statute 
provided that in a special proceeding, 
as opposed to an ordinary action, a dep-
42 
osition could not be taken until a ques-
tion of fact had arisen. Code of Civ. 
Pro. § 2021, repealed Cal. Stats. 1957, 
Ch. 1904, § 1, p. 3321. 
15. See Laddon v. Superior Court, 
167 Cal. App.2d 391, 334 P.2d 638 
(1959). 
16. See 4 Moore, Federal Practice 
§ 26.09. 
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California rules is based, and none deal with the question in 
any definitive way. Yet, in at least one case, Joseph v. Farns-
worth Radio & Television Corp.,17 there is support for the view 
that plaintiff may obtain discovery in order to amend his com-
plaint, which has been dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
In this instance, the court, upon dismissal of the complaint, 
listed certain additional facts that, had they been pleaded, 
would have cured the defects in the complaint. The court 
granted plaintiff leave to amend, stating that he should take 
defendants' depositions in order to ascertain the existence of 
such facts. The reason there are few federal decisions may 
be that the problem is not acute in the federal courts, 
where the very liberal "notice" pleading rules18 are easily 
satisfied. In California courts, where a plaintiff must allege 
"facts constituting the cause of action,m9 there is a greater 
need for presuit information. 
One cannot ignore the fact that serious abuses may develop 
if the courts permit broad discovery in cases where plain-
tiff's original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 
Trial judges frequently will be called upon to quash proposed 
interrogatories and depositions in such cases, and will be 
required to develop strict rules to keep the scope of the 
inquiry within bounds. At the very least, the courts would 
have to limit discovery to cases where plaintiff's original com-
plaint was filed in good faith and where the information sought 
is directly relevant to a potential issue. Determination of 
these matters might be difficult and would pose an added 
burden for our judges. 
On balance, interpretation of the current statutes to permit 
broad discovery after a complaint has been dismissed on de-
murrer is desirable, at least until enactment of a presuit dis-
covery statute. Otherwise, attorneys who believe their clients 
have valid claims, but who are unable to get facts, will be 
pressed to plead on speculation, and the more unscrupulous 
an attorney is, the better the job he will do for his client. 
17. 99 F. Supp. 701, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 
1951), aff'd 198 F.2d 883 (2nd Cir. 
1952). 
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V. Limitation on Amount of Recovery 
Maya party in a contested action be permitted to recover 
damages in excess of those in his prayer? The question is 
elementary and should have been clearly determined long ago. 
Unfortunately, recent court opinions have instead fostered 
a growing uncertainty as to this aspect of the law. 
In People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Jarvis,'J;f) a 
condemnation proceeding, defendant landowner originally 
prayed for severance damages in the amount of $100,000. At 
trial, the highest figure assigned severance damages by any of 
the expert witnesses was $107,100, whereas the jury awarded 
$124,230. 
Defendant evidently was fearful that he would not be per-
mitted to recover the jury award; he therefore sought to 
eliminate any basis for new trial by amending his prayer for 
relief to "conform to the proof" by demanding severance dam-
ages of $107,100, for which amount the trial court gave judg-
ment. The state appealed on the ground that the jury award 
was not justified by the evidence and that the trial judge had 
no jurisdiction to lower the award without violating the state's 
right to a jury trial. l 
The reviewing court held that the jury, by accepting those 
elements of each expert's testimony most favorable to the 
defendant landowner, could have legitimately found severance 
damages to be as high as $161,925,2 and that the verdict was 
fully justified by the evidence. The court went on to hold, 
however, that the trial judge properly entered judgment for 
the $107,100 figure on the basis of the "elementary rule that 
a party entitled to damages can recover no more than he 
pleads."a 
20. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
175 (1969). 
1. The state's position involved an 
interesting gamble. If the reviewing 
court agreed that the trial judge had no 
jurisdiction to lower the jury award and 
at the same time held that the award 
was justified by the evidence, the court 
44 
might well have felt impelled to order 
the trial judge to grant judgment on the 
verdict, thus costing the government 
an additional $17,130. 
2. 274 Cal. App.2d -, n.6, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 181, n. 6. 
3. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
182. 
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This latter determination seems in direct conflict with the 
words and spirit of section 580 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
which the court did not cite and which reads as follows: 
The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, 
cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his 
complaint; but in any other case, the Court may grant 
him any relief consistent with the case made by the com-
plaint and embraced within the issue. 
Section 580, is a typical provision having counterparts in vir-
tually every jurisdiction following the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure4 or code pleading5 practices. Its major purpose is 
to aid a party who in his pleadings misconceives the theory or 
nature of his action and, as a result, does not request the relief 
to which the facts he pleads and proves entitle him. The sec-
tion has its origin in the original equity practice wherein the 
chancellor was permitted to "do equity" by granting all the 
relief justified by the pleadings and the evidence.6 Thus, even 
if plaintiff makes no demand for damages whatever, such dam-
ages may nevertheless be awarded if the case otherwise so war-
rants.7 Following what would appear to be the clear mandate 
of this provision, the trial judge in Jarvis should have ignored 
defendant's prayer, in its original or amended form, and en-
tered judgment on the verdict. 8 The obvious misunderstand-
ing by the defendant, the trial judge, and the court of appeals 
in Jarvis as to the role of the prayer for relief in a contested 
4. See F.R.C.P. 54(c). 
S. See Clark, Code Pleading, pp. 
265-71 (2d ed., 1947). 
6. See Johnson v. Polhemus, 99 Cal. 
240, 245, 33 P. 908 (1893); McKesson 
v. Hepp, 62 Cal. App. 619, 217 P. 802 
(1923). 
7. E.g., State v. Hansen, 189 Cal. 
App.2d 604, 11 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1961); 
Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal. App.2d 682, 
139 P.2d 976 (1943); Cf. Wright v. 
Rogers, 172 Cal. App.2d 349, 342 P.2d 
447 (1959) (plaintiff, who prayed for 
damages only as alternative to cancel-
lation of deed, awarded both damages 
CAL LAW 1970 
and cancellation); Vaughn v. Jonas, 31 
Cal.2d 586, 191 P.2d 432 (1948) (plain-
tiff prayed only for compensatory dam-
ages but awarded both compensatory 
and punitive damages). 
8. Even if the verdict had not been 
justified by the evidence, the prayer for 
relief should not have governed the 
trial judge's rulings. If he felt that the 
jury had mishandled the entire case, he 
should have ordered a new trial; if he 
believed the jury had simply erred in 
its evaluation of damages, he could 
have given defendant the choice of a 
new trial of a remittitur. 
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matter can only be explained by a continuing failure of the 
California courts to distinguish cases where the verdict exceeds 
the formal prayer for relief, which is permissible under section 
580, from cases where the verdict exceeds the amount of dam-
ages shown to have been suffered by plaintiff's specific factual 
allegations, which is not permissible under section 580. The 
latter cases involve a simple matter of variance, which prevents 
a finding of fact in favor of a party when the finding is totally 
inconsistent with that party's own factual allegations. Such 
a variance can be cured in proper circumstances by an amend-
ment to conform to the proof.9 Of course, such an amend-
ment must be directed to the trial court's discretion and may 
be denied if unduly prejudicial or may be granted on condi-
tion that the case be reopened for further evidence. 
The court in Jarvis clearly demonstrated its lack of under-
standing of the problem before it by its heavy reliance on 
Kerry v. Pacific Marine CO.,lO a classic example of the variance 
situation. In Kerry, plaintiff alleged that certain goods had 
originally been worth 14 cents per foot, whereas after they 
had been damaged he had been forced to sell them at 9t cents 
per foot. The trial court awarded damages ,based on a 5 
cent per foot loss, but the reviewing court modified the judg-
ment to permit only 4t cents per foot, on the ground that 
plaintiff's recovery was limited by his factual allegations re-
garding damages. At no time was the prayer for relief dis-
cussed; it exceeded both of the amounts in question. The 
majority of other cases that have been cited from time to time 
as holding that a party cannot collect more than the amourit 
for which he has prayed in his complaint are analogous to 
Kerry and have no involvement whatever with the formal 
prayer for relief.ll 
9. See Meisner v. McIntosh, 205 Cal. 
11, 13, 269 P. 612, 613 (1928) (dic-
tum); Crofoot v Blair Holdings Corp., 
119 Cal. App.2d 156, 195-96, 260 P.2d 
156, 177-78 (1953) (dictum). 
10. 121 Cal. 564, 54 P. 89 (898), 
modified 6 Cal. Unrptd Dec. 118, 54 
P. 269 (1898). 
11. See, e.g., Meisner v. McIntosh, 
46 
205 Cal. 11, 269 P. 612 (1928); Merced 
Irrigation Dist. v. San Joaquin Light 
and Power Corp. 220 Cal. 196, 29 P.2d 
843 (1934). These decisions have been 
cited in such cases as Singleton v. Perry, 
45 Cal.2d 489, 499, 289 P.2d 794, 
(1955), and Frost v. Mighetto, 22 Cal. 
App.2d 612, 616-17, 71 P.2d 932, 
(1937). 
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There are a few decisions, however, where, at least on the 
surface, the distinction between the prayer for relief and the 
factual allegations of damages is not so clear. For example, in 
Frost v. Mighetto/2 four separate plaintiffs each sought small 
specific sums for their general and special damages arising 
from a single auto accident. Although the evidence appar-
ently supported awards by the trial court in excess of those 
pleaded, the reviewing court modified the judgment to limit re- . 
covery to the specific amounts pleaded, noting that plaintiffs 
had not sought to amend their claims to conform to the proof. 
With respect to claims for special damages this position is 
sound. Special damages must be specifically pleaded under 
California law if they are to be recovered. IS However, the 
question is more difficult when general damages are involved, 
especially in regard to one plaintiff, who sought only general 
damages in the amount of $500. The trial court awarded 
her general damages of $650 and special damages of $115; 
the reviewing court not only eliminated the latter, but cut 
the former to $500. Since the plaintiff did not plead any 
specific facts showing she was not entitled to more than $500, 
the $500 claim should, seemingly, have been considered as 
part of the prayer to which section 580 would be applicable. 
The reviewing court simply failed to make the subtle distinc-
tion required, and treated the claims for special damages and 
general damages alike. It relied solely on Kerry v. Pacific 
Marine Co. and similar cases where, as we have seen, 
damages were limited by factual allegations, not by the prayer 
for relief.l4 In several other cases where the courts appear 
to limit recovery to the amount of the prayer, the decision 
actually seems to turn on the fact that there was no evidence 
to justify a greater award15 or that specific allegations in the 
12. 22 Cal. App.2d 612, 71 P.2d 932 
(1937). 
13. See Chadbourn, Grossman & Van 
Alstyne, California Pleading §§ 932-34 
(1961 ). 
14. Compare Burke v. Koch, 75 Cal. 
356, 17 P. 228 (1888). 
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15. E.g., Brown v. North Ventura 
Road Development Co., 216 Cal. App. 
2d 227, 234, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 
(1963); Monterey Park Commercial & 
Savings Bank v. Bank of West Holly-




Friedenthal: Civil Procedu e
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Civil Procedure 
complaint limited the recovery to the amount sought in the 
prayer. 16 
Most disturbing is that the California courts, in spite of 
the growing confusion as to when the pleadings limit the 
amount of recovery, have refused to analyze and clarify the 
matter. In 1955, in Singleton v. Perry/7 the supreme court 
discussed the cases at some length, pointing out that there 
appeared to be a conflict among the decisions, but actually 
took no position on the matter, since in the case before it, 
the award was in fact less than the demand in the prayer. 
Nevertheless, the manner in which the court discussed the 
issue was somewhat misleading and has led one recent court 
of appeal,18 in dictum, to cite the case for the proposition 
that "even in contested cases the amount of recovery is limited 
generally by the prayer," a position that is totally unjustified. 
In addition, the supreme court itself, in the case of Boyle v. 
Hawkins,19 has, through inadvertence, increased the uncer-
tainty. The entire issue regarding the prayer for relief was 
dealt with at the end of the opinion as follows: 
Defendant argues that the judgment in this case was 
in excess of plaintiff's prayer for relief contained in his 
complaint; as such, the judgment would be erroneous as 
a matter of law. The judgment, however, did not exceed 
the prayer . . . . 
This statement by the court contains an unfortunate am-
biguity. It could mean simply that defendant argued that the 
judgment was erroneous as a matter of law, or it could mean 
that the Court itself was of the view that such a judgment 
would indeed be erroneous. 
Hopefully, the supreme court will take time, when the next 
similar case arises, to make itself clear. There is no doubt 
that section 580 should be affirmed and supported. Miscon-
16. E.g., Burke v. Koch, 75 Cal. 356, 24, 28, 66 Cal. Rptr. 888, 890 (1968) 
17 P. 228 (1888). (dictum). 
17. 45 Cal.2d 489, 289 P.2d 794 19. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
(1955). 161,168,455 P.2d 97,104 (1969). 
18. Leo v. Dunlap, 260 Cal. App.2d 
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ceptions by a party as to his damages cannot and should not 
limit him to the amount claimed in the prayer, especially 
since he is able to recover damages even if he misconceived 
his remedy and did not demand them at all. Otherwise, it 
will behoove all parties claiming damages to inflate their 
claims to ensure full recovery. On the other hand, when a 
party's specific factual allegations show that damages should 
be limited, he should be bound by those allegations, at least 
until they are amended. The opposing party may well govern 
the level of his preparation for trial according to such specific 
factual pleadings, and he could seriously be prejudiced if such 
specific pleadings are ignored. 
* 
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